TRIPS has imposed the dominant system of intellectual property on the world in the United States and Europe, as humans are today. I believe that the development of the IP system is not good for the United States and the EU; but I believe even more that it is not in the interest of developing countries. Trips-plus conditions, which impose standards beyond TRIPS, have also been verified.  These free trade agreements contain conditions that limit the ability of governments to introduce competition for generic drug manufacturers. In particular, the United States has been criticized for promoting protection far beyond the standards prescribed by the TRIPS. The U.S. free trade agreements with Australia, Morocco and Bahrain have expanded patentability by making patents available for new uses of known products.  The TRIPS agreement authorizes the granting of compulsory licences at the discretion of a country. The terms of trips plus in the U.S.
Free Trade Agreement with Australia, Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam have limited the application of mandatory licences to emergencies, remedies for cartels and abuse of dominance, and cases of non-commercial public use.  The 2002 Doha Declaration confirmed that the TRIPS agreement should not prevent members from taking the necessary measures to protect public health. Despite this recognition, less developed countries have argued that flexible TRIPS provisions, such as mandatory licensing, are almost impossible to obtain. The least developed countries, in particular, have made their young domestic manufacturing and technological industries proof of the infallible policy. Article 40 of the TRIPS ON Agreement recognizes that certain practices or licensing conditions related to intellectual property rights that limit competition can have negative effects on trade and impede the transfer and dissemination of technology (paragraph 1). Member States may adopt appropriate measures under the other provisions of the agreement to prevent or control abusive and anti-competitive intellectual property licensing practices (paragraph 2). The agreement provides a mechanism by which a country intending to take action against such practices involving companies from another Member State will consult with that other Member State and exchange non-confidential information relevant to the public for the issue in question and other information available to that member, subject to domestic law and the conclusion of satisfactory agreements for both parties regarding compliance with its confidentiality by the member. applicant member (paragraph 3).